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MATTERS IN ABATEMENT
Aaron R. Petty*
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 2105 of the Judicial Code, which forbids appellate
review of non-jurisdictional matters in abatement, is perhaps the
most commonly ignored limitation on federal jurisdiction.1
Certainly it is one of the most puzzling. Although it has been on
the books, in one form or another, since the Judiciary Act of
1789, it has received scant attention from the bench, bar, and
academy. What little regard the legal community does pay it is
largely negative. Wright, Miller & Cooper, one of the few
authorities that appears to be aware of this provision's
existence,2 went so far as to call for its "[p]rompt repeal,"
suggesting that it could not be applied coherently, and that
sporadic invocation, facile avoidance, and blatant disregard were
all inferior alternatives to its speedy demolition. 3
I believe such concerns are overwrought. Congress acted
wisely in removing non-jurisdictional matters in abatement from
the field of appellate concerns. The courts, unfortunately, do not
appear to have made as much of the statute as they might.
Particularly in light of the increasing workload of the federal
*Appellate Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Office of Immigration
Litigation; B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., University of Michigan. The views
expressed in this Article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the
views of the United States or the Department of Justice.
1. Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice &
Procedure vol. 15A, § 3903, 141, 144 (2d ed., West 1992) (noting that "the most important
feature of § 2105 is certainly its disuse"); see also Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d
50, 54 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd 490 U.S. 495 (1989) (suggesting that section 2105 "is not to be
taken literally").
2. Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra n. 1, at 141-48; see also Coastal Steel Corp. v.
Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 212 (3d Cir. 1983) (Rosenn, J., concurring)
(citing Wright, Miller & Cooper and noting the statute's "position of obscurity").
3. Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra n. 1, at 147-48.
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courts of appeals,4 the time has come to resurrect § 2105, dust
off the decades of disuse, and apply it with renewed vigor. Here,
I suggest how that might be done, and how a better
understanding of abatement could draw new light into the void
between jurisdiction and merits.
In Part II, I trace the history of the provision from its initial
enactment as part of the first Judiciary Act to its reincarnation in
its present form as part of the wholesale revision of the Judicial
Code in 1948. In Part III, I describe how courts have employed
the provision over the years, with particular emphasis on the
roles played by its three main substantive components:
"reversal," "matters in abatement," and "involve jurisdiction." I
conclude that, in an attempt to minimize the statute's reach (and
avoid analysis of "abatement"), courts have improperly read the
core of the statute too narrowly and its main exception too
broadly. After offering what I believe to be a more robust
reading of the statute, I then proceed in Part IV to discuss ways
in which courts might think about abatement generally, with a
special focus on where to place it on the jurisdiction-merits
spectrum and how this ancient plea could be rationally
incorporated into a modern procedural system. I suggest that
applying the emerging notion of mandatory rules to identify
matters in abatement assists in its categorization, and that
abatement adds color to this recently recognized concept.
I conclude that when properly construed, the prohibition on
review of matters in abatement other than jurisdiction is a
narrow, useful bar on resorting to the federal courts of appeals.
Avoidance of section 2105 by the courts is neither necessary nor
warranted. Rather than repeal, increased awareness of this little
4. See e.g. Matthew Funk, Student Author, Sticks and Stones: The Ability ofAttorneys
to Appeal from Judicial Criticism, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1485, 1502 (2009) (citing Bolte v.
Home Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 1984) (referring to "an age of congested
appellate dockets")); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Studying Deck Chairs
on the Titanic, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 1290, 1290 (1996) (referring to the "rapidly growing
caseload" in the federal courts of appeals); Peter B. Rutledge, Book Review, Sorcerers'
Apprentices: 100 Years of Law Clerks at the United States Supreme Court and Courtiers of
the Marble Palace: The Rise and Influence of the Supreme Court Law Clerk, 74 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 369, 384-85 (2007) (noting that "federal appellate courts have confronted an
increasing workload in recent years"); but see e.g. Thomas E. Baker, Applied
Freakonomics: Explaining the "Crisis of Volume", 8 J. App. Prac. & Process 101 (2006)
(discussing increased volume of appellate cases, but concluding that courts have adapted to
larger caseloads and are deciding virtually all appeals filed).
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provision by the bench and bar would assist them in achieving
the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination"'5 of many
actions by preventing another round of litigation where none
should be had.
II. HISTORY OF SECTION 2105
Passed shortly before the first session of the Supreme Court
(and therefore before the federal government truly began
functioning),6 the Judiciary Act of 17897 has been lauded as
"probably the most important and the most satisfactory Act ever
passed by Congress." Through its thirty-five sections, the Act
establishes the Supreme Court and inferior federal courts9 and
defines the scope of their powers, from such minutia as directing
the timing of their sessions and place of meeting, and permitting
the appointment of clerks and marshals'o to the scope of federal
jurisdiction and its allocation between the district, circuit, and
Supreme courts."
Section 22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 concerns the
appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts and Supreme Court.' 2
It provides that in civil actions in which the matter in dispute
exceeds fifty dollars (exclusive of costs), final judgments of the
district courts "may be re-examined, and reversed or affirmed in
a circuit court, holden in the same district, upon a writ of
error."l 3 Similarly, it allows for direct appeals to the Supreme
Court from final judgments and decrees in civil actions and suits
5. Fed. R. Civ. P. I (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
6. Alison L. LaCroix, The New Wheel in the Federal Machine: From Sovereignty to
Jurisdiction, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 345-46.
7. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73-93
(1789) [hereinafter "Judiciary Act of 1789"] (available in electronic form from the Library
of Congress at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collld=llsl&fileName=00UllslOO1
.db&recNum=196).
8. Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
Harv. L. Rev. 49, 52 (1923) (quoting Henry B. Brown, The New Federal Judicial Code, in
Report of the 34th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association 339, 345 (Lord
Baltimore Press 1911)).
9. Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 1-4.
10. Id. at §§ 5, 7, 27.
11. Id. at §§ 9-26.
12. Id. at § 22.
13. Id.
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in equity (either original actions or actions removed from state
court) where the matter in dispute exceeds two thousand
dollars.14 And then it addresses matters in abatement, using
language that foreshadows the language now in section 2105:
But there shall be no reversal in either court on such writ of
error for error in ruling any plea in abatement, other than a
plea to the jurisdiction of the court, or such plea to a
petition or bill in eqcity, as in the nature of a demurrer, or
for any error in fact.
Laws governing the structure of the federal judiciary
underwent considerable change in the early years of the
Republic,' 6 but the prohibition on review of pleas in abatement
continued on, more or less unchanged, until the 1948 revisions
to the Judicial Code.' 7 In that year, the statute, which had been
codified initially in the then-new U.S. Code as section 879 of
14. Id. at § 22(a).
15. Id. at § 22(b).
16. The Judiciary Act of 1789 was cautious in its grant of jurisdiction to federal courts.
The Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 Stat. 89-100 (1801), by contrast, expanded federal jurisdiction
significantly. For a thorough and extensive discussion of why this occurred, see LaCroix,
supra n. 6. But the expansion was short-lived. The 1801 act, along with an amending act,
An Act for Altering the Times and Places of Holding Certain Courts Therein Mentioned
and for Other Purposes, ch. 32, 2 Stat. 123-24 (1801), were repealed in 1802, restoring the
organization and powers of the courts as they were in 1789. See An Act to Repeal Certain
Acts Respecting the Organization of the Courts of the United States; and for Other
Purposes, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132 (1802). The federal courts were further reorganized that year,
see An Act to Amend the Judicial System of the United States, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156-67
(1802), and a further amendatory act was passed in 1803. See An Act in Addition to an Act
Intitled "An Act to Amend the Judicial System of the United States," ch. 40, 2 Stat. 244
(1803). It is this last amendatory act that is cited in the later statute books discussing the
origins of the prohibition on reviewing pleas in abatement, see e.g. 28 U.S.C § 879 (1940)
(noting that § 879 was derived from 2 Stat. 244), perhaps because it repeals so much of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 as is contrary to it. The 1803 act, however, has nothing to say
regarding appellate jurisdiction over pleas in abatement.
17. Gasparini v. Ctr. for the Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 451 n. 1 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the "restriction remained in
place until the 1948 revisions of the Judicial Code"). In 1948, the entire Judicial Code was
revised, codified, and enacted into positive law. An Act to Revise, Codify, and Enact into
Law Title 28 of the United States Code, Entitled "Judicial Code and Judiciary," Pub. L.
No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869-1009 (1948). Note, however, that there had been one small
change in the relevant section prior to 1948: After its codification in the Revised Statutes of
the United States at section 1011, a clerical amendment was passed to return "for error in
ruling and plea in abatement" to its correct form "any plea in abatement." See An Act to
Correct Errors and to Supply Omissions in the Revised Statutes of the United States, ch.
80, 18 Stat. 316, 318 (1875).
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Title 28, was moved to its present location at section 2105.18
More significantly, the prohibition on review of facts was lifted.
The revisers' notes observe that the language was deleted "to
avoid any construction that matters of fact are not reviewable in
nonjury cases."' 9 The previous incarnation of the statute had
applied only to writs of error, which were available only in
actions at law.2 0 As the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
enacted in 1938, abolished any distinction in federal courts
between actions at law and suits in equity,2 1 the revisers
concluded that clarification was appropriate. Their comments
also note that as Rule 7(c) abolished all pleas and required that
all requests for a court order be made by motion, it was
necessary to replace the phrase "plea in abatement" with "matter
in abatement." Changes were made to phraseology as well.
The result is the little-known statute that we are left with
today. Its twenty-seven words read: "There shall be no reversal
in the Supreme Court or a court of appeals for error in ruling
upon matters in abatement which do not involve jurisdiction."24
III. INTERPRETATIVE PROBLEMS
Given the paucity of cases construing-or even applying-
section 2105,25 it is hardly surprising that no overarching theory
has developed to explain what falls within its ambit. How much
jurisdiction section 2105 removes from federal appellate courts
is governed by three terms in the statute: "reversal," "involve
jurisdiction," and "matters in abatement." 26
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
19. Id. (advisory comm. notes).
20. Id.
21. Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2105.
23. Id. For example, the earlier reference to the now-defunct circuit courts of the
United States was replaced by a reference to the modem "courts of appeals."
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2105.
25. Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra n. 1, at 144 (remarking on "disuse"). Perhaps only
two things are certain: Section 2105 does not apply in criminal cases, Roche v. Evaporated
Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 27 n. 3 (1943), and it does not apply to review of state-court
decisions in the Supreme Court, Buck Stove & Range Co. v. Vickers, 226 U.S. 205, 213
(1912).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2105.
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As section 2105 is generally thought a nuisance (or at best
a relic of a bygone legal era), the general tendency with regard
to "reversal" and "involve jurisdiction" has been to construe the
former narrowly and the latter broadly, so as to make section
2105 applicable in as few cases as possible. 27 The meaning of
the phrase "matters in abatement," as the courts have come to
realize, is a difficult question. The biggest problem seems to be
that no one knows what it means, and a number of courts have
suggested that this has been the case for some time.28 The result
is a poorly developed, poorly understood, and poorly grounded
body of law. Before courts can apply this statute in a consistent,
sensible manner, it is necessary to interpret each of its functional
clauses in a way that is internally consistent with each of the
others and that gives substantive content to the statute as a
whole.
A. "Reversal"
One way in which courts have avoided applying section
2105 has been to construe the statute as prohibiting only reversal
in the narrowest sense of the word. In United States v. Alcon
Laboratories,29 the FDA initiated a seizure and injunction action
against Alcon for distributing a drug called WANS without
having undergone the necessary procedure for new drugs. 30
Alcon responded that WANS was not a "new drug," and moved
for a remand to the FDA for a determination of whether WANS
was a "new drug."3 1 The district court remanded the action with
instructions to defer regulatory action until WANS's "new
27. See Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra n. 1, at 143-44, 145-46.
28. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 196 ("Nineteenth century lawyers were obviously better
versed in the meaning of pleas in abatement than are we."); McHie v. McHie, 78 F.2d 351,
353 (7th Cir. 1935) ("[W]e find difficulty in understanding the section from its wording
alone."); cf Dellaripa v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 257 F.2d 733, 734 (2d Cir.
1958) (citing Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15, 32 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and
Bowles v. Wilke, 175 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1949), but providing no explanation for why statute
does not apply); but see Aetna St. Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1970)
(suggesting rather hopefully that "[t]he language of this section of the statute is clear and
explicit").
29. 636 F.2d 876 (1st Cir. 1981).
30. Id. at 879-80.
31. Id. at 880.
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drug"-status had been determined.32 The government appealed,
and the First Circuit held, inter alia, that the remand order was
appealable under the collateral order doctrine, but in so doing
was obliged also to respond to Alcon's argument on appeal that
section 2105 prevented it from taking jurisdiction of the
matter.33 Without reaching the question whether the issue
involved a "matter in abatement," the court reasoned that its
vacating the district court's order and remanding for further
proceedings was "not, technically, a 'reversal."' 34
Wright, Miller & Cooper find this reasoning
unpersuasive,s and I agree. Conditioning appellate jurisdiction
on the outcome of an appeal is absurd. Jurisdiction grants courts
the authority to reach the merits of a dispute. 3 6 Reading the
statute to require a court to reach the merits in order to decide
whether it could reach the merits is utter nonsense. Of course,
courts always retain jurisdiction to determine their own
jurisdiction. But that rule permits courts to determine facts and
reach legal conclusions generally apart from (although
sometimes overlapping with) the merits of the case.38 Collapsing
32. Id.
33. Id. at 884-85.
34. Id. at 885 n. 2. Similar reasoning was employed in S.E. Fed. Power Customers, Inc.
v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316, 1321 n. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (pointing out that "because reversal is
not justified, the court need not decide whether 28 U.S.C. § 2105, which precludes reversal
by 'a court of appeals for error in ruling upon matters in abatement which do not involve
jurisdiction,' prevents review of the abatement motion").
35. Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra n. 1, at 145-46 (noting that it is "barely possible to
argue" the point).
36. E.g. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. _, , 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2126 (2009)
("Subject-matter jurisdiction determines only whether a court has the power to entertain a
particular claim-a condition precedent to reaching the merits of a legal dispute."); Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (citing Ex Parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1869): "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in
any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only
function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.").
37. E.g. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 118 (Stevens & Souter, JJ., concurring); U.S. v. United
Mine Workers ofAm., 330 U.S. 258, 290-91 (1947).
38. See e.g. In re LimitNone, 551 F.3d 572, 577-78 (7th Cir. 2008) (observing, among
other things, that it "would be awkward, at best, to suggest that district courts must resolve
their own jurisdiction before proceeding to factual disputes necessary to that very
determination"). The same holds true for courts of appeals. See e.g. Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (differentiating between factual inquiries necessary to
determine jurisdiction, which may be decided by the judge, from claims for relief, for
which the jury is the trier of fact, and stating that "courts, including this Court, have an
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jurisdiction and merits into a single-if not backward-inquiry
would work an extraordinarily significant alteration in federal
practice, one that should not be assumed absent a clear
congressional directive. 9
Moreover, the word "reversal" in section 2105 reaches
back to the first version of the statute in the Judiciary Act of
1789.40 Section 22 of the Act provides for appellate jurisdiction
of the circuit courts and Supreme Court, noting that in each,
final judiments may "be re-examined and reversed or
affirmed." But vacatur, modification, and other dispositions
after appeal are not found in the first Judiciary Act.42 The
jurisdictional nature of that early provision would be clearer if
rather than noting that there shall be no "reversal," Congress had
instead specified no "reversal or affirmance," as it did in other
provisions of section 22, but the intent of the provision to limit
jurisdiction of reviewing courts is obvious from the context 43
and there is now no serious question that the modem statute is
anything other than jurisdictional."
The best reading of "there shall be no reversal" in section
2105 is therefore simply as a notice that the statute prohibits
appellate review of matters in abatement not involving
jurisdiction. In modem legal parlance, it might be rendered as
independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the
absence of a challenge from any party").
39. Cf Cleveland v. U.S., 531 U.S. 12, 24 (2000) (declining to extend federal criminal
jurisdiction in the absence of a clear congressional statement); McNary v. Haitian Refugee
Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1991) (concluding that jurisdiction existed to review
immigration-amnesty program absent clear congressional language to the contrary);
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Op. Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 814 (1988) (relying on clear
congressional intent to determine limits of Federal Circuit's jurisdiction); Ex parte Yerger,
75 U.S. 85, 102-03 (1868) (declining to assume that appellate jurisdiction does not extend
to petitions for writs of a habeas corpus); but see generally Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious
Concept ofJurisdiction, 54 Hastings L.J. 1613 (2003) (acknowledging that it is well settled
that jurisdiction and merits are distinct, but contending that they are conceptually part of
the same inquiry).
40. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 22(b).
41. Id. at § 22.
42. See generally Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 73-93. However, remands are
discussed in Sections 24 and 25 of the Act.
43. See id. at § 22; see also n. 40-42, supra, and accompanying text.
44. See Teixeira v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 261 F.2d 153, 154 (1st Cir. 1958)
(dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction); Bowles, 175 F.2d at 38 (concluding that appeal
must be dismissed); McHie, 78 F.2d at 354; see also Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 196-97
(assuming that statute is jurisdictional).
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"neither the Supreme Court nor any court of appeals shall have
jurisdiction to hear" them. Such a reading conforms to the
historical understanding of the statute,45 interprets it in a manner
consistent with the common canons of statutory interpretation, 4 6
and dispenses with one element of the "facile avoidance"
decried by Wright, Miller & Cooper.47
B. "Involve Jurisdiction"
"Jurisdiction," it has been said, is a word of "many, too
many meanings."4 8 And the word's inherent ambiguity49 in
section 2105 is amplified by its equally vague neighbor and
modifier, "involve." What "involve[s] jurisdiction"? The courts
have been quick to answer "almost everything." This
interpretation of the most obvious exception5 o to the general rule
against reviewing matters in abatement creates several
problems: It fits poorly into the prevailing modem judicial
conception of federal jurisdiction. It extends the reach of the
statute to situations it was not intended to reach. It makes the
outer limits of the exception difficult to define. And, as a result,
it permits the exception to start down the path toward
swallowing the rule. These results are not commanded by the
statute, nor are they necessary to its proper application. Of
course, some matters in abatement truly do involve jurisdiction
in a narrow sense, and they are, by the statute's own terms,
outside of its reach. But there is no need to construe this
exception so broadly as to render the other limitations on its
application unnecessary or to empty the statute of nearly all of
its substance.
45. See Piquignot v. Penn. R.R. Co., 57 U.S. 104, 105-06 (1854) (assuming statute is
jurisdictional).
46. See e.g. Small v. US., 544 U.S. 385, 404 (2005) (Thomas, Scalia & Kennedy, JJ.,
dissenting) (discussing canon against absurdities); see also U.S. v. Mannava, 565 F.3d 412,
417 (7th Cir. 2009) (Posner, J.) (explaining that "[1]iteral interpretations that produce
absurd results are not only unacceptable grounds for legal rulings that affect rights and
interests; they also misunderstand 'interpretation"').
47. Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra n. 1, at 148.
48. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 215 (2007) (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer,
JJ., dissenting) (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90, and collecting cases).
49. See id. at 215-16 (citing the "erroneous jurisdictional conclusions that flow from
indiscriminate use of the ambiguous word").
50. Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra n. 1, at 143.
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The most notorious example of using the jurisdictional
exception to read out the rest of the statute occurred in the
Supreme Court's opinion in Snyder v. Buck.5 In that case, the
widow of a sailor sued the paymaster general of the Navy for an
unpaid survivor's benefit.5  While the action was pending, the
paymaster general retired, and the widow failed to move to
substitute the new paymaster general within the six months
permitted.53 The court of appeals held that the action had abated,
vacated the district court's judgment, and remanded the case
with instructions to dismiss the action.54 The Supreme Court
affirmed, and noted-almost in passing and without
explanation-that section 2105 posed no obstacle to review
because "[t]he absence of a necessary party and the statutory
barrier to substitution go to jurisdiction." f
Two of the more recent cases from the courts of appeals go
further. In Alcon Labs,56 the First Circuit held in the alternative
to its holding applying the term "reversal," that the district
court's order remanding the case to the FDA "can be understood
as involving jurisdiction. " The Alcon court relied heavily on
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Aetna State Bank v.
Altheimer,59 in which the decedent had pledged shares of a
corporation as collateral for a loan. The bank sold the shares
after his death, applied the proceeds against the outstanding
debt,60 and then filed an action in state court against the estate
for the remaining deficiency. The estate counter-claimed,
asserting that the sale was not commercially reasonable and that
51. Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15, 16 (1950).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 16-17.
54. Id. at 17-18. The holding was premised on section I1(a) of the Judiciary Act of
1925, 43 Stat. 936, 941. The modem rule, permitting automatic substitution of successors
in office, was implemented in 1961. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) & 1961 advisory comm.
notes (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
55. Snyder, 340 U.S. at 22.
56. U.S. v. Alcon Labs., 636 F.2d 876 (1st Cir. 1981).
57. See supra Part III.A., nn. 29-34 and accompanying text.
58. Alcon Labs., 636 F.2d at 885 n. 2.
59. 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970) abrogated by Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d
792 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding Aetna no longer good law in light of Colo. River Water
Conserv. Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800 (1976)), rev'd, 437 U.S. 655 (1978)).
60. Id. at 751.
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the bank knowingly sold the shares to insiders.6 ' A few months
later, the bank filed an action in federal court alleging that the
decedent's actions amounted to fraud and deceit under Rule
1 Ob-5.62 Only after initiating the federal action did the bank raise
a Rule 1 Ob-5 defense in the action pending in state court.63
The estate eventually moved the federal court to abate the
federal action in favor of the earlier-filed state-court action; the
federal court granted the motion. 64 The bank appealed, and the
Seventh Circuit affirmed. Construing the motion as a request for
an abstention, the court of appeals held that, as the district court
intended to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction, the order
involved jurisdiction and therefore could be reviewed without
running afoul of section 2105. 65
Alcon Labs and Aetna State Bank, which remand and stay
proceedings over which the court would otherwise have
cognizance, suggest that the term "involve jurisdiction" extends
beyond the question whether the court is endowed with
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter to the court's
discretion in the exercise of its jurisdiction. This is justifiable
only as a means to escape deciding whether a particular order
qualifies as a matter in abatement in the first place.
As Wright, Miller & Cooper note, the approach taken in
Aetna State Bank "obviously would permit review of all matters
of abatement, since all involve the same basic question whether
the court should presently exercise its jurisdiction." 66 Taken to
its logical conclusion, this approach would permit the exception
to swallow the rule. Reading the statute in this manner should be
avoided if at all possible.6 Exceptions to statutes must be read
narrowly "in order to preserve the primary operation of the
provision."68 An expansive reading of an ambiguous exception
61. Id. at 751-52.
62. Id. at 752.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 753-58.
66. Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra n. 1, at 144.
67. The canon against the exception swallowing the rule is so frequently invoked by the
Supreme Court that recently it has been unaccompanied by further citation or explanation.
See e.g. Cuomo v. Clearing House Assn. L.L.C., 557 U.S.___ , 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2718
(2009).
68. Commr. of Internal Revenue v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989).
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would "eviscerate" the underlying policy of Congress. 69 And it
is no answer that the underlying policy itself may be ambiguous.
If the prohibition on reviewing matters in abatement is to mean
anything, it must mean something apart from the exception for
matters involving jurisdiction.
But Snyder still presents something of a roadblock to
acceptance of this analysis. The best way around it may be to
acknowledge that the case concerned a procedural requirement
that has been defunct for nearly fifty years, and it may be time to
read Snyder as limited to its archaic facts. Certainly, it does not
appear from the opinion that the Court had anything grander in
mind. Its treatment of the jurisdictional exception to section
2105 is terse in the extreme; it provides no rationale-and no
roadmap-for future application. Matters concerning the
exercise of jurisdiction should not fall within the exception to
section 2105; only those that concern the existence of federal
jurisdiction should be excepted.
At its narrowest, federal jurisdiction is composed of
subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.70 Matters in
abatement involving these issues have historically been held to
fall within the exception.7  For instance, subject-matter
jurisdiction may be Premised on the diverse citizenship of the
parties to the action. If the parties are not diverse and there is
no other basis for federal jurisdiction, no subject-matter
jurisdiction is conferred on the federal courts. Accordingly, a
party's citizenship has always been held to involve jurisdiction
in a diversity case because it is a necessary precondition to the
federal courts' exercising authority over the case. Similarly,
the Supreme Court has suggested that proper service of process
is necessary to obtaining jurisdiction over the person, and so
review of its effectiveness not barred by section 2105.74
69. Id.
70. See e.g. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004) (defining jurisdiction as "the
classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling
within a court's adjudicatory authority").
71. Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra n. 1, at 143 ("The exception clearly permits review
of rulings on subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction.").
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
73. See e.g. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Tompkins, 101 F. 539, 541-42 (4th Cir.
1900).
74. Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1895).
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This narrow definition of jurisdiction as only those
conditions necessary to the exercise of the judicial power of the
United States is gaining firm ground in the federal courts. In a
number of recent cases, the Supreme Court has explained what
is not jurisdictional, and scholars are working on disentangling
the traditional formulation of "mandatory and jurisdictional,"
and treating each of its components as a separate limitation on
federal judicial power. 76 This understanding, as well, is gaining
traction. Given this definition of jurisdiction, the only matters
in abatement excepted from the rule are those that are necessary
to determining whether the federal courts are empowered to
decide the cases before them. Assuming for now that they are in
fact matters in abatement, matters that "involve jurisdiction"
would include service of process, citizenship and amount in
controversy (for diversity cases), and any other precondition
necessary to either subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. All
other matters in abatement are unreviewable. Under this
definition, the stays and remands in cases like Alcon Labs and
Aetna State Bank would be barred from review under section
2105-but only if they are indeed matters in abatement.
C. Matters in Abatement
From the outset, courts have disfavored resolving an action
on a plea in abatement as it turns on procedure rather than the
merits of the action. 7 Now the procedure itself is obscure,
clouded both by the passage of time and its unfamiliarity to the
modem legal mind. No one seems to know what abatement
entails. The Fourth Circuit recently noted that abatement is "the
equivalent of a dismissal," although not all dismissals qualify as
75. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. 500; Eberhart v. US., 546 U.S. 12 (2005); Kontrick, 540 U.S.
443.
76. See e.g. Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2008); Scott Dodson,
In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 55 (2008); but see Bowles, 551
U.S. at 209 (continuing to use the term, though not in an outcome-determinative manner).
77. See e.g. Wis. Valley Improvement Co. v. U.S., 569 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2009)
(Easterbrook, C.J.) (explaining that a rule can be mandatory without being jurisdictional);
Zhong v. U.S. Dept. ofJust., 480 F.3d 104, 117-25 (2d Cir. 2007).
78. Aetna St. Bank, 430 F.2d at 754 (citing 1 C.J.S. Abatement and Revival §§ 4, 193
(1936)).
79. See n. 28, supra.
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abatement.80 Examples of defenses raising abatement may
include
* prematurity, i.e., the plaintiff commenced the
lawsuit before the underlying cause of action
accrued;
* the plaintiffs interest in the pending lawsuit has
terminated or transferred to another party;
* a lawsuit cannot proceed because of the death of
either the plaintiff of the defendant; and
* there is a separate, identical lawsuit pending.8'
In addition, irregularity in service of process may serve as
the basis for a motion in abatement8 2 (though one "involving
jurisdiction")83 and that, prior to 1961, a public official's
retirement or resignation abated actions against him in his
official capacity. 4 Abatement on the death of a party is not
limited to natural persons, but includes the dissolution of a
corporation as well. Finally, abstention in favor of ongoing
state-court 8roceedings has been held to constitute a matter in
abatement.
Out of these decisions, courts have attempted to extract a
workable definition of "matter in abatement." They have largely
been unsuccessful. In fact, there appear to be at least three
competing interpretations, though courts sometimes allude to
more than one definition as though they were complementary.
80. Hyman v. City of Gastonia, 466 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2006).
81. Id.
82. Knox v. Summers, 14 F. Cas. 831 (C.C.D.C. 1805), rev'd, 7 U.S. 496 (1806)
(holding that appearance by attorney waived irregularity of process).
83. Goldey, 156 U.S. 518.
84. Snyder, 340 U.S. at 22; Bowles, 175 F.2d at 38; ef Acheson v. Fujiko Furusho, 212
F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1954) (denying motions to dismiss and directing substitution of new
office-holders as parties).
85. U.S. Shipping Bd. Emerg. Fleet Corp. v. S. Atl. Dry Dock Co., 300 F. 56, 61 (5th
Cir. 1924).
86. Aetna St. Bank, 430 F.2d at 754-55.
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1. The Expansive Definition: Nonjurisdictional Dismissal
without Prejudice
The least promising definition is a product of the Third
Circuit's opinion in Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman
Wheelabrator Ltd.87 In that case, the defendants sought review
of both an order denying them leave to appeal an order from the
bankruptcy court, and review of a district-court order affirming
the bankruptcy court's dismissal of a related case. 8 The
defendants maintained that a forum-selection clause on which
their contract liability was premised dictated the claims to be
adjudicated elsewhere. 89
The Third Circuit court considered, first, whether the
collateral order doctrine permits interlocutory appeal of the
denial of a motion to dismiss based on a forum-selection clause.
Although the appellate jurisdiction of the courts of appeals is
generally limited to "final decisions" of the district courts, 90 a
small class of interlocutory, "collateral" orders are immediately
reviewable if they conclusively determine issues that are
important and completely separate from the merits, and will be
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.91 It is
the last element of unreviewability on which the court focused.
The Third Circuit concluded at the outset that, because the
collateral order doctrine did not yet exist when section 2105 was
first enacted, that section applies only to appeals after a full trial
"to prevent post-trial consideration of non-jurisdictional pleas in
abatement." Next, the court defined "matter in abatement"
broadly-to include all "those non-jurisdictional motions which,
if granted, would result in the dismissal of an action without
prejudice to its reconsideration when re-filed in another forum
or in another pleading."93 The court noted that a motion to
dismiss on grounds of a forum selection clause fit that
definition: it was not jurisdictional and had no bearing on the
87. 709 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1983).
88. Id. at 192.
89. Id.
90. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
91. See e.g. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
92. Coastal Steel, 790 F.2d at 196.
93. Id. (citing Bowles v. Wilke).
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merits underlying the action. 94 Because the dismissal order was
a matter in abatement and could not, under its reading of section
2105, be appealed after final judgment, the court determined that
the order satisfied the third prong of the Coopers & Lybrand test
for effective unreviewability. 9 And because the court had
already held that section 2105 does not appl y to interlocutory
appeals, it was no bar to review before trial. As a result, the
court concluded that it possessed appellate jurisdiction over the
non-final order denying the motion to dismiss. Not surprisingly,
the case provoked one judge to concur with a lengthy and
vigorous challenge to the majority's logic, which has not been
followed elsewhere.
The chief problem with Coastal Steel's expansive
definition of abatement is readily apparent. If review of an order
denying a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause
was barred by section 2105, appellate jurisdiction would not
exist over a number of other types of orders as well. Abstention
or deference to state, administrative, or private proceedings,
motions to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens or, in
some instances, improper venue, all fit the Coastal Steel
definition. 97 Yet no one has seriously suggested that courts of
appeals lack jurisdiction over these orders by reason of section
2105, and the concurring judge in Coastal Steel observes that
given that section's obscurity, it would be anomalous to suggest
that it represents a heretofore unknown, but striking, limitation
on federal appellate jurisdiction, particularly since the point was
raised only by way of inquiry into the collateral order doctrine.98
"Matters in abatement," therefore, must mean something
narrower than any (nonjurisdictional) ground for a dismissal
without prejudice.
94. Id. at 196-97.
95. Id. at 197.
96. Id.
97. See Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 212 (Rosenn, J., concurring); Wright, Miller &
Cooper, supra n. 1, at 142 n. 27 (noting the Coastal Steel definition is "not persuasive").
98. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 212 (Rosenn, J., concurring); see also Chasser v. Achille
Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 490 U.S. 495 (1989) (collecting
numerous cases including Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (review of
forum non conveniens dismissal) and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947)
(same)).
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Confidence in Coastal Steel is also hampered by problems
with the majority's analysis apart from its definition of
abatement. The Second Circuit observes that the majority's
distinction between interlocutory appeals and appeals after final
judgment with regard to section 2105 cannot hold because if
Congress has stripped jurisdiction from the court, the Supreme
Court is not empowered to revive it by announcing a new
doctrine in the absence of a constitutional mandate. In any
event, the collateral order doctrine purports to be an application
of, rather than a true exception to, the final judgment rule 00 and
it assumes, aside from finality, that the order in question is
otherwise reviewable.' 0 Finally, the majority's foundational
suggestion that section 2105 was intended to reach only post-
trial pleas in abatement seems highly suspect, as abatement
precedes a determination on the merits; it is a request to refrain
from a merits adjudication. I have found no authority suggesting
that an action can abate after a determination on the merits.
2. The Broad Definition: "Suspension or Defeat"
The Fourth Circuit recently, in Hyman v. City of
Gastonia,102 approached a more workable definition of what
constitutes a matter in abatement. There, the court held that
"[g]enerally speaking, abatement refers to '[t]he suspension or
defeat of a pending action for a reason unrelated to the merits of
the claim."'l 03 And a recent decision from the Ninth Circuit
echoes this "suspension or defeat" language.104 Conversely, a
99. Chasser, 844 F.2d at 53.
100. See e.g. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 307 (applying collateral order doctrine
and noting that denial of qualified immunity "is a 'final' judgment" within the meaning of
section 1291).
101. Chasser, 844 F.2d at 53.
102. 466 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2006).
103. Id. at 287 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 3 (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 8th ed. West
2004) (second set of internal brackets in original)). Curiously, Hyman also cites the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Bowles, 175 F.3d at 38, which employs quite a different
definition of abatement. See infra Part Ill.C.3.
104. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1118 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Black's Law
Dictionary). Black's also explains that, although suspension of an action may constitute
abatement under some circumstances, abatement in that sense is not coterminous with a
stay. Black's Law Dictionary 3 (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 9th ed. West 2009). Black's also
notes that, unlike a stay, which may be denied in the discretion of the court, abatement of
an action is a matter of right. Id.; cf Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. _, _, 129 S. Ct. 1749,
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court may grant a stay where a plea in abatement could not be
sustained.
This definition, although not as facially problematic as that
employed in Coastal Steel, is not frequently employed. No court
of appeals has addressed, in the context of this definition, what
order might constitute a matter in abatement that suspends the
action without defeating it. Although it is written more
generally, this definition may suffer from the same problems as
the Coastal Steel definition. Abstention, for example, suspends
an action and is unrelated to the merits. In the absence of some
compelling reason why a definition that is not well-pedigreed
(Black's cites only the legal encyclopedia Corpus Juris
Secondum) and not well known should be given any more
credence than it presently has, the preferable course must be to
define abatement through reasoning and reference to better
authority.
3. The Narrow Definition: "Overthrow or Destruction"
Probably the most common definition of matter in
abatement comes from Bowles v. Wilke, in which the Seventh
Circuit explained that
[a]batement at law is the overthrow or destruction of a
pending action apart from the cause of action. .. . it is [t]he
overthrow of an action. .. which defeats the action for the
present, but does not debar the plaintiff from commencing
it in a better way.lo0
The Bowles court relied on McHie, in which it had already
concluded that
[t]he defense [of abatement] is one which merely defeats
the present proceeding, and does not conclude the plaintiff
forever, either as to his right to sue in the circuit court of
the United States or as to the merits of the matter in
dispute. 07
1754 (2009) (distinguishing a stay from an injunction: "the authority of a court of appeals
to stay an order ... is not affected by the statutory provision governing injunctions").
105. Nken, 556 U.S. at _, 129 S. Ct. at 1761 (noting that former practice included
automatic stay because alien's petition for review of an immigration decision once "abated
upon [his] removal" from the United States).
106. Bowles, 175 F.2d at 37-38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. McHie, 78 F.2d at 353.
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And the McHie court, in tur, quoted from Stephens v.
Monongahela National Bank, 1o which appears to have been the
Supreme Court's first and last word on the subject.109 In addition
to having the imprimatur of the Supreme Court, the Bowles
definition remains relatively current."
The Bowles definition has several advantages. It avoids the
pitfalls courts have found with the Coastal Steel definition.
Likewise, it bypasses the ambiguity in the Hyman definition. It
is, as a general matter, consistent with modem notions of federal
appellate jurisdiction by permitting review of orders that are
now routinely reviewed. Finally, it is also relatively simple and,
as a result, should not be difficult to apply. The most important
substantive difference between this definition and the others is
that an order that does not overthrow or destroy the action
cannot be a matter in abatement. Under this definition, for
example, it is clear that orders staying proceedings for any
reason are not matters in abatement, and therefore there is no
jurisdictional bar in section 2105 to their review. (Of course, 28
U.S.C. § 1291 may pose a greater barrier.) Dismissals on
grounds of duplicity, capacity, or failure to substitute a
successor in office under the old rule all fit under this definition.
The action is defeated for the present-dismissed without
prejudice-but the plaintiffs rights are not impaired (provided
the statute of limitations has not expired). The plaintiff may file
another action, for example, if the earlier-filed duplicate action
108. 111 U.S. 197 (1884).
109. The Stephens court, like that in McHie, cites Piquignot, 57 U.S. 104, and although
Stephens treats Piquignot as turning on the predecessor to section 2105, see Stephens, Il 1
U.S. at 198, I am not convinced. The Piquignot court explained that the court below had
followed the Pennsylvania practice of simply providing a record that a judgment had been
made and in which party's favor instead of specifying the grounds for the judgment. As a
result, on writ of error, the Supreme Court could not determine whether the circuit court
had dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction due to a failure in the
pleadings to allege the citizenship of the railroad company, or whether the court had abated
the action as duplicative of another action pending in state court. Addressing jurisdiction
first, the Supreme Court affirmed what it assumed to have been a dismissal for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. As it appears that the Court never reached the question of
abatement, I can only conclude that the predecessor to section 2105 never came into play.
110. See e.g. Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 771 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that "a
matter in abatement is a matter that defeats an action but that does not prevent it from being
commenced in a better way") (italics in original); Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra n. 1, at
142 (quoting Bowles).
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is also dismissed without prejudice, if the incapacity to sue or be
sued is removed, or if the proper party is named.
D. Toward a Standard
Treating the statute's phrase "there shall be no reversal" as
a notice that the rule is jurisdictional,1 " defining "matters in
abatement" to include only those dismissals without prejudice
on grounds other than the merits that destroy the action but not
the cause of action, 1 2 and limiting the phrase "involve
jurisdiction" to its intended role as an exception for those
dismissals that relate to the court's power to adjudicate the
present dispute," 3 improves significantly upon the current
interpretive goulash permeating section 2105. First, it casts aside
the wholly unpersuasivell 4 and the bizarre' 1 5 arguments that
some courts have suggested. Second, it provides a modicum of
guidance regarding how the statute could be coherently applied
to future cases. This is essential, as the infrequency of courts'
citation to section 2105-which seems to increase as time
passes-and the almost complete lack of commentary on, or
explanation of, its language compounds as each new case rests
on older ones, whose own foundations are not always clear.
Perhaps most importantly, this interpretation also suggests
a decisional framework. The "reversal" factor, as it describes the
nature of the statute but is not otherwise substantive, can be
disregarded in analyzing whether a particular matter is
reviewable. It provides the outcome of a positive analysis
(dismissal), but is not itself a factor in determining whether a
matter is reviewable. That inquiry is limited only by whether an
order qualifies as a matter in abatement and whether it involves
jurisdiction. These should not be independent inquiries. Only if
an order qualifies as a matter in abatement should the
jurisdictional exception be examined.1 6  Applying this
111. See supra Part III.A.
112. See supra Part III.B.
113. See supra Part III.C.
114. See supra Part III.A.
115. See supra Part III.C.1.
116. Unlike the rules articulated in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 808
(2009) (qualified immunity) and Strickland v. Wash., 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective
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framework will prevent courts from reading the exception too
broadly. It will also force them to grapple with the meaning of
what it means, in the era of the federal rules, for an order to be a
matter in abatement. To be sure, the question is a difficult one.
But when squarely confronted with the issue, courts should at
least attempt to find a reasonable place for this ancient law in
modem practice. I believe such a place exists.
IV. ABATEMENT AS A MANDATORY RULE
One of the problems that confronted the Coastal Steel court
was how to classify abatement-a category of ground upon
which a case may be disposed-along a spectrum that does not
readily admit of new categories. A court may resolve a case in a
number of ways. First, a case may be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction if the court lacks the power to adjudicate the
controversy for want of either subject-matter jurisdiction or
personal jurisdiction over the parties. Once jurisdiction is secure,
a case may still be dismissed for a number of reasons, and the
dismissal may be with prejudice (that is, claim preclusion
attaches: if the same claims are raised in another action against
the same party, that action must itself be dismissed with
prejudice) or without prejudice (that is, without claim
preclusion, leaving the plaintiff free to raise the same claims
again in a new action). Dismissal with prejudice may be
appropriate, for example, if the defendant is immune from suit,
as a sanction for severe abuse of the legal process, or, more
often, if the complaint fails to state a claim and no amendment
could save it. A dismissal without prejudice likewise may be
granted for a number of reasons: if, for example, the allegations
are not definite enough to permit an answer, but an amended
complaint might be made, or if administrative remedies must be
exhausted as a precondition to suit, but have not been. A
complaint may also be dismissed without prejudice for
prudential reasons: forum non conveniens and the several
assistance of counsel), section 2105 does not appear to envision a two-part test, in the
application of which the order of decision is a matter of judicial discretion. The plain
language of the statute suggests that the better reading is to construe it as stating a rule and
an exception, and to infer that a court must find that the rule would otherwise apply before
considering the applicability of the exception.
157
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACrICE AND PROCESS
abstention doctrines come to mind." 7 But if the court has the
power to adjudicate the controversy, the complaint states a
recognized cause of action, and there is no good reason to defer
to proceedings in some other tribunal, the court will generally
resolve the matter on the merits by determining the rights and
liabilities of the parties based on the facts giving rise to the
controversy." 8
Abatement, as Hyman explains, is a species of dismissal
without prejudice." 9 It is a decision apart from the merits. At the
same time, abatement is surely not a matter limited to
jurisdiction, or else the exception in the statute would be
unnecessary and the statute would apply to no cases at all. The
Seventh and Ninth circuits have recognized that abatement falls
between the two poles of jurisdiction and merits, but stopped
there.120 Yet the gulf between jurisdiction and merits is wide.12 1
Defining matters in abatement subject to section 2105 simply as
non-jurisdictional, non-merits dismissals without prejudice is
not particularly helpful. This sort of negative definition (even a
partial one) does not draw firm lines,12 nor does it square with
the case law.123 Something more is needed.
117. Abstention, of course, is "a common-law doctrine that 'causes strange things to
happen in federal courts."' Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction's Noble Lie, 61 Stan. L. Rev.
971, 990 (2009) (quoting James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize
the Abstention Doctrine, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1049, 1050 (1994)). But a consideration of
abstention and its permutations is beyond the scope of this article.
118. See Colo. River Water Conservation. Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 813, 817 (1976)
(quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959) in noting that
district courts have a general duty to adjudicate cases properly before them and referring to
federal courts' "virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given
them").
119. Hyman, 466 F.3d at 287.
120. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1118 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2005) (indicating that
abatement is a non-merits issue); Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 1332, 1333 n. 1 (7th
Cir. 1983) (same).
121. But see Lee, supra n. 39.
122. Cf Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting, in class-action
context, the "ambiguities inherent in ... negative definition" and that such a definition
"draws no readily identifiable line"). The difficulty is lessened when the choice of
definitions is binary, see Sentinel Comms. Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189, 1202 (11th Cir.
1991) (discussing differences between "public" and "non-public" fora in First Amendment
context), but that is not the case here.
123. Here is just one example: Dismissals without prejudice to re-filing after exhausting
administrative remedies are common in actions filed by prisoners subject to the restrictions
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Exhaustion is an affirmative defense; it is a non-
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Marshalling the orders that do fall within a negative
definition is a useful starting point for analysis of what that
"something more" might be.' 2  The class relevant here, that
defined as cases involving non-jurisdictional, non-merits
dismissals without prejudice, is large. It would include, at a
minimum, Younger,'2  Burford/Thibodaux, 26 and Colorado
River 2 7 abstentions (but not Pullman 28 abstentions); dismissals
due to lack of capacity of a party to sue or be sued, including
dismissals due to death, corporate dissolution, and (prior to the
enactment of Fed. R. Civ. P. 25) successors in public office;' 29
failure to exhaust administrative remedies; improper venue;' 30
forum non conveniens;' 3 1 failure to pay the filing fee or file a
proper motion to proceed in forma pauperis; and likely more. Of
course, most of these types of orders are routinely reviewed by
the appellate courts. What distinguishes those that should fall
within section 2105 from those that should not? I suggest that in
merits, non-jurisdictional dismissal without prejudice. Yet the question of exhaustion is
routinely heard and decided by the courts of appeals. See e.g. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 81 (2006) (holding in a PLRA case that "proper exhaustion of administrative remedies
is necessary" and reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision that the exhaustion requirement
could be satisfied by actions that do not follow established procedural rules).
124. Cf Hershey Foods Corp. v. Hershey Creamery Co., 945 F.2d 1272, 1276-77 (3d
Cir. 1991) (beginning analysis of injunction orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) by
reviewing types of orders that have been held not to fall under the section).
125. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that federal courts are barred from
hearing civil rights torts claims by a person who is being criminally prosecuted in state
court for his actions arising from the same course of events).
126. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); La. Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), together holding that courts sitting in diversity are
permitted to defer to state courts where state courts have special expertise in a complex
area of state law, or where the action concerns issues of state law of great importance to the
state, such that a federal court's exercising jurisdiction would infringe on state sovereignty.
127. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 819-20 (holding federal litigation duplicative and
indicating that it should be dismissed in deference to comprehensive state proceedings).
128. Abstentions under Railroad Commn. of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941),
involve stays only, not dismissals. In a case of this type, the district court retains
jurisdiction while state courts resolve issues of state law. Accordingly, a Pullman
abstention would not fall within this negative definition of matters in abatement.
129. See supra rn. 51-55 and accompanying text.
130. See Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra n. 1, at 142 n. 27. Dismissals for improper
venue are rare when transfer to another federal court is possible. See e.g. 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) (providing that "a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought") (available at http://www.uscode.house.gov).
131. See Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra n. 1, at 142 n. 27 (contrasting Coastal Steel
with Chasser).
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order for a non-jurisdictional, non-merits dismissal without
prejudice to fall within section 2105, the dismissal must be
predicated on a mandatory rule.
In several recent articles Scott Dodson and other scholars
have begun the work of severing the word "mandatory" from the
oft-invoked phrase "mandatory and jurisdictional," and
describing the characteristics that might make a rule mandatory
without being jurisdictional.132 Dodson explains that a true
jurisdictional rule is not subject to waiver, forfeiture, consent, or
estoppel; that it must be policed by the court sua sponte; and that
it can be raised at any time by any party or the court. 133 A
mandatory rule, in contrast, is not jurisdictional in the sense of
affecting the power of the court to adjudicate a particular class
of disputes but it may nonetheless possess certain jurisdictional
qualities." Dodson suggests that a mandatory rule is subject to
waiver, forfeiture, consent, and estoppel, it need not (yet perhaps
may) be policed by the court sua sponte, but importantly, if it is
properly invoked, the court "has no discretion to excuse
noncompliance." 35 The definition of matters in abatement that I
suggested above would make them fall within this category:
* Abatement does not affect the power of the court to
adjudicate a controversy;
* It perhaps could be, but generally is not, policed by
the court sua sponte; and
* When it is properly raised, courts do not appear to
believe that they have discretion to continue the
litigation.
Thus, abatement is a mandatory rule. A dismissal without
prejudice is a matter in abatement only when it is the result of a
132. See e.g. Dodson, supra n. 75 (examining waiver, forfeiture, consent, equitable
exceptions, and sua sponte policing as attributes of mandatory rules).
133. Id. at 5 (citing cases).
134. Id. at 9 (explaining that "[a] mandatory rule is nonjurisdictional but nevertheless
has the jurisdictional attribute of being unsusceptible to equitable excuses for
noncompliance").
135. Id.
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non-jurisdictional condition precedent to suit or to a decision on
the merits that is not fulfilled.13 6
This rule can be illustrated by examining those categories
in which either a stay or a dismissal might result. Compare, for
example, Younger abstention with the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies: In both situations, the court may either
order a stay or order the complaint dismissed while the state
court or administrative tribunal proceeds. Generally, it seems,
courts have a preference for dismissal, but if there is good cause
for a stay (for example, if the other proceedings do not toll the
statute of limitations), stays are granted as well. In either case,
if the court enters a stay, that order does not destroy the action,
but merely suspends it, so the stay order is not a matter in
abatement. If, however, the court dismisses the complaint, there
is a difference. Younger abstentions are mandatory. That is,
courts have no discretion to proceed further once the standard
for abstention is met.1 38 It is a non-jurisdictional, non-merits
condition precedent to a decision on the merits, so review of the
district court's decision should be prohibited. Failure to exhaust,
however, is an affirmative defense.1 39 Courts have no obligation
to raise it on their own and, indeed, should not unless it is plain
on the face of the complaint that the action is frivolous. 14 0
Because the courts are permitted to entertain actions when there
136. As I use the term "mandatory" here, I mean that the rule does not go to the power
of the court to adjudicate the dispute, but is one that must be satisfied nonetheless before
the court will do so. This is actually somewhat narrower than Dodson's use. See id.
137. See e.g. Tucker v. Kingston, 538 F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining, in
habeas context, that either dismissal or stay may be appropriate, depending on certain
factors including statute of limitations: "[D]istrict courts are to consider whether a stay
might be more appropriate than an outright dismissal").
138. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. City ofNew Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989)
(observing that Younger held that "federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal
prosecutions"); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden St. Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423
(1982) (instructing federal court of appeals to abstain from deciding a challenge to state
disciplinary rules so long as a state action was pending); Sendak v. Nihiser, 423 U.S. 976,
978 (1975) (Brennan, Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting from order vacating judgment
and remanding case for further consideration) (noting that Younger is a "limit").
139. In Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211-12 (2007), the Supreme Court held exhaustion
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act to be an affirmative defense, and suggested that,
absent a special pleading requirement in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it was the
default position for all exhaustion requirements.
140. Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.)
(collecting cases); see also Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995).
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has been a failure to exhaust administrative remedies but the
defendant has elected not to raise the point, the rule is not
mandatory, the issue is not a matter in abatement, and,
accordingly, it is not barred from appellate review by section
2105.
Defining matters in abatement subject to section 2105 in
this way has several useful advantages. First, the definition is
quite narrow (narrower even than that required by my synthesis
of the cases above), and therefore potentially upsets as little
settled law as possible. Reading the statute to forbid appellate
review of orders relating to abstention, improper venue, or
forum non conveniens should be avoided, as the Supreme Court
hears such issues with some regularity.' 4 '
Second, this definition makes sense with regard to the
division of labor between the district and appellate courts. Most
final judgments should be appealable. Experience makes clear
that section 2105, if it is anything, is an exception to the general
rule embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Next, the proposed definition can be applied in practice.
There are few rules unrelated to jurisdiction that must be
fulfilled before a court will entertain an action. They include
payment of the filing fee (or properly filing a motion to waive
it); Younger abstentions that result in dismissal; and failure to
substitute a deceased party within ninety days after the personal
representative is served with the sug estion of death. There
may be more, but not likely many.43 And these issues are
generally so fact intensive that little would be accomplished by
permitting review. It seems unlikely that a court of appeals
would ever find that a district judge clearly erred in determining
whether a filing fee has been paid or whether a motion to
substitute was filed.
141. See Sinochem Intl. Co. v. Malay Intl. Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007) (forum
non conveniens); Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989) (forum-selection
clause); Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra n. 1, at 142 n. 27.
142. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) (available at http://uscode.house.gov). The language of
Rule 25(a)(2), indicating that "the action does not abate" after the death ofa party, suggests
that the mandatory dismissal explained in subsection (a)(1) is called abatement.
143. Perhaps dismissal under the doctrine of Totten v. U.S., 92 U.S. 105 (1875)
(prohibiting actions against the government based on covert espionage agreements), would
be among them. I make no attempt to assemble an exhaustive list, but note only that its
components are few.
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Finally, this definition is largely consistent with historical
precedent. At common law, abatement was broader than
jurisdiction, applying when, for reasons unrelated to the merits
of the case, the action could not be maintained as filed, though a
new action might cure the defect. The apparent rationale for
abatement at common law was that once the basis for the
abatement was brought to the attention of the court, the action
could not proceed and there was no alternative to dismissal. This
rationale is carried forward under section 2105 by excluding
from the definition of abatement matters that are discretionary or
otherwise do not prevent a resolution of the case on the merits.
The current state of the law could be brought into accord
with this framework without much difficulty, although it would
require some adjustments. The first roadblock concerns
Stephens, Piquignot, and Colorado River. Stephens and its
reading of Piquignot hold that a dismissal on the ground that the
action duplicates another is a matter in abatement and
unreviewable under section 2105. The Colorado River Court, by
contrast, reviews an order dismissing an action as duplicative.
But this is less a problem of application and more a problem of
synthesizing precedent. Given that Colorado River is by far the
more recent case, perhaps it would simply be best to consider
Stephens implicitly overruled to the extent that it conflicts with
that decision. The other obstruction is the small array of orders
that are presently reviewed but, under this interpretation of
section 2105, ought not to be. 1" Put simply, they should not be
reviewed. It is possible that section 2105 extends only to review
of the facts. But that seems unlikely given that the section states
generally that "there shall be no reversal," not that there shall be
no reversal with regard to law only. And as there was a separate
prohibition on review of facts in the predecessor to section 2105
as early as the eighteenth century, the logical conclusion is that
section 2105 is intended to include reversals on the law as well.
144. See e.g. Atkins v. City of Chicago, 547 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.)
(reviewing order under Rule 25(a)).
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V. CONCLUSION
In the 220 years since it was first enacted, Congress has
altered the prohibition on reviewing non-jurisdictional matters in
abatement remarkably little. The legal world, in contrast, has
undergone singular change. As a result, incorporating section
2105 into the modem legal vernacular has proved surprisingly
difficult. Courts have ignored it, 145 abused it, 146 and pushed and
pulled it,14 7 some for no reason other than unfamiliarity.14 8
Functionally, the provision remains potentially a useful tool in
limiting appellate jurisdiction and conserving judicial resources.
Given an appropriate level of analysis, the statute can be applied
coherently and, although it is not likely to be invoked frequently,
a more nuanced understanding of its provisions would offer
much to the ongoing exploration of the nature of the
jurisdiction-merits spectrum. And indeed, that analysis by courts
and scholars has already suggested a new class of mandatory
rules. Repeal of section 2105 is certainly unnecessary. The work
essential to a modem understanding of the statute has only
begun.
145. Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra n. 1, at 141.
146. Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 196-97 (characterizing 2105 as among the sections of
Title 28 "most commonly ignored").
147. Snyder, 340 U.S. at 22 (construing "involve jurisdiction" broadly); Alcon Labs.,
636 F.2d at 885 n. 2 (construing "reversal" narrowly).
148. See n. 27, supra, and accompanying text.
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